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COMPUTATION OF PROPORTIONATE OWNERSHIP
OF THE FAMILY RESIDENCE UPON
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
I. INTRODUCTION
In a community property jurisdiction divorce involves not only an
end to marriage, but a termination of the community property relation-
ship as well.' Upon dissolution of marriage, it is the duty of the court
to account for and divide the assets and debts of the community.2 This
requires the court to evaluate and inventory the marital property, as
well as to classify each asset as either community property or the sepa-
rate property of one of the spouses.
One of the most difficult problems facing a court in a marriage
dissolution action is determining the proper division of the family resi-
dence where separate property funds constituted part of its purchase
price.4 The problem is even more troublesome where the residence was
acquired not only with a dual source of funds, but with a combination
1. A community property system regards marriage as a form of partnership between
the spouses - a "conjugal partnership in earnings and gains during the marriage." 1 W.
DEFuNiAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 535 (1943). The end of the marriage
thus means the end of this partnership, for the marriage is "only the occasion for the part-
nership which the spouses have in the earnings and gains during its subsistence." Id The
system has been described as:
that system whereby the property which the husband and wife have is common
property, that is, it belongs to both by halves. There are varying forms... rang-
ing from the general community .. . in which all the property of the spouses
owned by each at the time of the marriage, as well as all that acquired after mar-
riage, becomes a part of the community property; to the community only of ac-
quests and gains during the continuance of the marriage. It is this latter or
ganancial system and which came to this country from Spain which prevails in
several of our... states.
DeFuniak & Vaughn, Why Community Property is so Misunderstood, I COMMUNITY PROP.
J. 97, 97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DeFuniak & Vaughn].
2. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 372, 618 P.2d 208, 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662,
665 (1980).
3. See Vaughn & Margolis, Community Property and the Death of a Spouse: Income
Tax Consequences, 3 COMMuNrrY PROP. 1. 19, 24 (1976) [hereinafter Vaughn & Margolis].
Although the article deals chiefly with the problems that would be encountered by a lawyer
preparing income tax returns in the year of the death of a spouse, the same principles would
guide a court in dividing and classifying assets upon dissolution of marriage.
4. This may be a particularly bitterly contested issue, especially in light of the rising
price of real estate in California today. It has been said that:
[t]he issue of who gets the family house, and how much thereof, on divorce is
heating up everywhere in the face of skyrocketing real estate prices. Now more
than ever, the principal asset of many marital communities may be the equity in a
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of funds and debt, especially if the debt has not been completely retired
at the time of dissolution.
In two unanimous 1980 decisions,5 the California Supreme Court
rejected some traditional notions of dealing with this "classic problem
in the sorting-out incident to marital settlement agreement or trial."
'6
The supreme court altered (1) the requirements for establishing a sepa-
rate property interest in the family residence 7 and (2) the formula used
to compute its value. The focus of this comment is the current formula
used to compute proportionate ownership interests in family residences
subject to the California community property system. In particular,
this comment will compare the results obtained when the separate
property contribution is made during marriage vis-a-vis the results ob-
tained when the contribution is made before marriage.
II. BACKGROUND - THE CALIFORNIA PRO RATA APPROACH
In a community property system all property owned or acquired
by the spouses during marriage must be classified as community or sep-
arate property. This classification process is governed by statutory
definitions of community and separate property and by certain judicial
presumptions. Typically, community property statutes specify the
"limited categories of separate property and then negatively provide
that everything else acquired during marriage is community in na-
ture."9 Thus, the California Civil Code provides that all property
owned by a spouse before marriage, or acquired during marriage by
gift, bequest, devise, or descent is separate property,10 and that all other
property acquired during marriage is community property."I
house; and with the larger numbers carried by inflation, the fight for the house
becomes the focal point of more court contests.
Particularly is this the case in California, where prices have been known to
quadruple in a few years ....
Editorial, 6 COMMUNITY PROP. 3. 381, 382 (1979).
5. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980); In
re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
6. Lurvey, Dividing the Community Residence "here Part of the Contribution Derives
from Separate Property, 7 COMMUNITY PROP. L 259, 259 (1980).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
8. H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 188 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as VERRALL].
9. See Vaughn & Margolis, supra note 3, at 21.
10. "All property of the wife, owned by her before marriage, and that acquired after-
wards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, issues, and profits thereof, is her
separate property." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5107 (West 1970). Section 5108 contains an identical
provision relating to the husband's property.
11. "Except as provided in [those sections defining separate property], all real property
situated in this state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during the mar-
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The California courts have interpreted the Civil Code as raising a
general presumption that all property acquired during marriage is com-
munity, rather than separate, property.12 This is the basic community
property presumption, referred to as the general or pro-community pre-
sumption. 13 While all property acquired by the spouses during mar-
riage is presumed to be community property, each spouse remains
capable of owning separate property, and separate property owned or
acquired by either spouse before marriage remains the separate prop-
erty of that spouse during marriage.14  This remains true even if the
separate property is exchanged for cash or a different piece of
property.
15
Property acquired with both separate and community funds, how-
ever, presents a conceptual problem: what is the proper division of
property between the community and the spouse contributing separate
funds? In particular, this problem arises in the so-called "continuing
transaction case"16 in which the the property is purchased with a down
payment and a long term note or mortgage. Typically, in such cases
the down payment and one or more loan payments are made with sepa-
rate property funds, with some or all of the remaining balance on the
loan discharged with community property funds.
Most community property jurisdictions determine ownership of
such installment acquisitions at the time of the initiation of the transac-
tion. 7 Ownership is fixed at the time the contract to purchase arises,
riage by a married person while domiciled in this state... is community property." CAL.
CrV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1982).
12. See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 673
(1979). See also VERRALL, supra note 8, at 97.
13. W. REPPY, CoMMUNrrY PROPERTY IrN CALIFoRNIA 62 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
REPPY].
14. See In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673; Estate
of Caswell, 105 Cal. App. 475, 481 (1930); see also DeFuniak & Vaughn, supra note 1, at 97.
15. See 89 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673. This so called "exchange princi-
ple" provides that separate property does not lose its separate character merely because it
changes its form. Thus, property acquired in exchange for separate property remains sepa-
rate property - the status of the converted property attaches to the new property. It has
been said that, "[i]t is fundamental to the community property system that the nature of
funds or other property is not changed by conversion into new property." Vaughn & Mar-
golis, supra note 3, at 22.
16. See VERRALL, supra note 8, at 188; see also REPPY, supra note 13, at 85. The author
notes that the easiest cases in which to determine proportionate interests are those involving
assets acquired during marriage with known amounts of community and separate funds
"paid over at one time as the complete purchase price of the asset .... [When an asset is
bought over time on installment payments, things become more complicated."
17. Young, Community Property Classclation of Credit Acquisitions in Calforni" Law
Without Logic, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 173, 176 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Young]. The author
1982]
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and the separate or community character of the funds used to initiate
the purchase attaches permanently to the property acquired in the
transaction. This "inception of right" approach vests title irrevocably
at the time the contract is entered into, regardless of the source or
amount of any subsequent payments on the loan.' 8 Under this ap-
proach, property acquired by a spouse in.a transaction initiated prior to
marriage remains the separate property of that spouse, with the com-
munity entitled only to reimbursement for any community funds ap-
plied towards the purchase price." Thus, where a spouse initiates the
acquisition of an asset with separate property funds, the community
acquires no ownership interest in that asset by virtue of making subse-
quent loan payments with community property funds.
California has rejected the "inception of right" theory in favor of
an alternative approach. California case law "gives to the community a
pro tanto community property interest in such property in the ratio that
the payments on the purchase price with community funds bear to the
payments made with separate funds."2 That is, the California ap-
proach to the problem of an installment transaction involving both sep-
arate and community property funds is to apportion the property 'ro
rata to the extent that separate and community resources in fact con-
tribute to the acquisition."'" The asset purchased with dual source of
funds is partially reclassified, becoming part community property and
part separate property in proportion to the funds used from each
source. The pro rata approach has been consistently and repeatedly
endorsed by the California courts.22
notes that all community property jurisdictions hold to the position that credit transactions
must be classified as separate or community at the time of acquisition, but "[w]hether the
credit acquisition should later be reclassfiedinpart to reflect partial contributions from sepa-
rate community sources, depends upon whether the court is in an 'apportionment of title'
jurisdiction (California) or an 'inception of right' jurisdiction (most other states)." Id at 237
(emphasis in original). For an overview of the law in other jurisdictions, see id at 226-51.
18. Id at 176.
19. See VERRALL, supra note 8, at 188.
20. Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 325, 257 P.2d 721, 722 (1953); accord.In re
Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 371-72, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
21. Young, supra note 17, at 176.
22. See, e.g., Inre Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 371-72, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal.
Rptr. at 664; In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 224,256-57, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483,491
(1972); Ortega v. Ortega, 118 Cal. App. 2d 589, 594-95, 258 P.2d 594, 597-98 (1953); Forbes
v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 325, 257 P.2d 721, 722 (1953); Giacomazzi v. Rowe, 109
Cal. App. 2d 498, 501, 240 P.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1952); Gettman v. Department of Water &
Power, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865, 197 P.2d 817, 819 (1948); Estate of Caswell, 105 Cal. App.
475, 482, 288 P.2d 102, 104-05 (1930); Maskuns v. Maskuns, 93 Cal. App. 27, 29-30, 268 P.
1093, 1094 (1928).
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The California pro rata approach originated in the landmark case
of Vieux v. Vieux.23 In Vieux the husband, prior to marriage, con-
tracted to purchase a lot, and made a $280.00 down payment. During
marriage, the purchase was completed, using $553.68 of community
property funds and $2,200.00 received from the execution of an oil
lease on the lot. The court rejected the husband's contention that the
lot was his separate property, stating that "so far as outlay on the part
of the husband from his separate property was concerned. . ., he ac-
tually expended . . . somewhat less than one-tenth of the purchase
price; while. . . approximately one-fifth of the purchase price. . was
contributed from funds belonging to the community."24 Accordingly,
the court held that the lot was community property to the extent that
the purchase price was contributed by the community and "that the
community interest was entitled to share in the title to the property in
the same proportion as the amount contributed to the purchase price by
the community."25
The Vieux court obviously regarded apportionment of title as re-
sulting in a more just outcome than would be obtained by using the
inception of right theory, and it went to some length to justify its
holding:
For purposes affecting strangers, the acquisition [of real prop-
erty] through an installment contract. . . may be considered
as ownership of such property. . .; but as between husband
and wife, where community funds are used to a considerable
extent in the payment of the purchase price, the meaning of
the statute relating to the definition of separate and commu-
nity property of spouses cannot be so limited. The confiden-
tial relationship existing between husband and wife forbids
such a strict construction to be placed upon the statute as will
destroy the probable intent of the husband and wife with ref-
erence to the manner in which the ownership of the property
is enjoyed. Any other construction in these days of liberal
terms with reference to installment purchase price contracts
23. 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 P. 640 (1926).
24. rd at 225, 251 P. at 641.
25. Id at 229, 251 P. at 643. Although the court stated that the total purchase price of
the lot was "in the neighborhood of $3,000.00," a sum which clearly includes the $2,200
received from the oil lease on the property, the court excluded this sum when calculating the
separate and community contributions towards the purchase price. Id at 225, 251 P. at 641.
The prop6rtionate community interest was thus that proportion that $553.68 bears to
$833.86. Id at 229, 251 P. at 643. This would make the community ownership of the lot
66.4%.
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for the sale of real property, including the possible provision
of "a dollar down and a dollar per week," would permit a
husband, or a prospective husband, to buy or to agree to buy
any reasonable quantity of lots or lands on the payment by
him from his separate funds of a comparatively insignificant
sum and thereafter to pay practically the entire purchase price
from community funds, and yet successfully maintain that be-
cause in its inception the naked right to purchase, carrying
with it the right of use and possession, was his separate prop-
erty, it so remained. It would seem improbable that. . . the
intention of the lawmakers was to bring about a result which
* . would be of so disastrous and unjust a consequence.26
The court concluded that "justice demands that the rights of the parties
should be measured by the direct contributions made by the respective
parties to the purchase price of the property. '27 The interest of the
community in installment acquisitions partially purchased with com-
munity funds is not limited to mere reimbursement, but encompasses
proportionate ownership of the property in the ratio of the community
contribution towards the purchase price to the separate property contri-
bution towards the purchase price.
Although the Vieux court included interest and taxes in its compu-
tation of the community contribution towards the purchase price,28 the
California courts have "commonly understood" the rule of pro rata ap-
portionment to exclude payments of interest and taxes. 29 The method
traditionally used by the courts to compute proportionate ownership
interest was explained in Bare v. Bare.0 In that case, the court of
appeal reversed a trial court determination that the family residence
was the separate property of the husband. The husband had taken title
to the property prior to marriage. Subsequently, $4,000 of community
funds were expended during the marriage to reduce the amount of the
encumbrance on the house.3'
The Bare court first cited the rule that in such instances there is a
pro tanto community property interest "in the ratio that the payments
on the purchase price with community funds bear to the payments
made with separate funds, '3 2 and went on to define this interest to
26. Id at 227-28, 251 P. at 642."
27. Id at 229, 251 P. at 643.
28. Id at 224, 251 P. at 641.
29. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 372, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
30. 256 Cal. App. 2d 684, 64 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967).
31. Id at 689, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
32. Id at 690, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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represent the "ratio of the community investment to the total separate
and community investment in the property."33  The court apparently
assumed that the community contribution was represented by the in-
crease in equity attributable to community funds, and considered the
contributions of the parties to consist of equity payments only. This
differs from the method of calculating the community and separate
contributions used by the Vieux court, which included such expendi-
tures as interest and taxes.34 The Bare court then stated that "[i]n the
event the fair market value has increased disproportionately to the in-
crease in equity, the wife is entitled to participate in that increment in a
similar proportion."
35
The Bare *court held that the community property share should not
be limited to reimbursement (the equity contributed by community
funds) where the asset's overall value has increased greatly beyond the
increase in equity. This is, of course, a reiteration of the holding of
Vieux that it is inequitable to limit the community interest to reim-
bursement of funds invested in the property. The overall reasoning of
the Bare court appears to be that where significant capital appreciation
has occurred it must be shared; reimbursement would be appropriate
only in cases where essentially all of the increased value of the resi-
dence was accounted for by an increase in equity.
This concern with sharing of capital appreciation conforms to the
Vieux court's rejection of the inception of right theory on the ground
that justice demands apportionment of title where dual sources of
funds have been used in the acquisition of an asset.36 Selection of the
pro rata theory means that the spouses will share in any increase in
value, while the use of the inception of right theory will award the en-
tire increase as separate property to the spouse who initiated the trans-
action.37 Because the inception of right rationale limits the community
interest to reimbursement, if "the asset in question (typically realty) has
appreciated in value at a rate exceeding ordinary interest rates on in-
vested funds, compensation for community contributions will ordina-
33. Id at 690, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
34. 80 Cal. App. at 224, 251 P. at 641. The Vieux court stated it had based its computa-
tions upon "the total amount paid by the respective parties." Id at 229, 251 P. at 643.
35. 256 Cal. App. 2d at 690, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 339. In this context, the equity in a house is
simply that portion of the purchase price which actually has been paid, i.e., purchase price
minus outstanding loan balance. It therefore consists of the down payment and the amount
of the loan principal that has been repaid.
36. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
37. See W. REPPY & W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
221 (1975).
1982]
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rily be greater"38 with the pro rata approach. The pro rata approach of
Vieux awards to the community the full value of that part of the acqui-
sition paid for with community funds during marriage. To regard that
portion of an asset purchased with community funds as community
property is certainly consistent with the idea that has been described as
the "heart" of the community property system-the presumption that
all property acquired during marriage is community property.
3 9
III. THE REVISED PRO RATA APPROACH
.4. Background- In re Marriage of Aufmuth
In In re Marriage of Aufmuth, the court of appeal affirmed the
application of a pro rata division method which differed from the tradi-
tional equity contributions formula.4 1 The trial court's method of ap-
portionment treated the entire loan amount as money actually
contributed toward the purchase price.
In Aufmuth, a home was purchased during marriage for $66,500.
A $16,500 down payment was supplied from the wife's separate prop-
erty, with the balance of the price being supplied by a $50,000 deed of
trust executed by both husband and wife. All subsequent payments
and expenditures connected with the house were made from commu-
nity property funds.42 At the time of trial, the property had a fair mar-
ket value of $125,000, reflecting a capital appreciation of $58,500.
At trial, the wife claimed the home was entirely her separate prop-
erty, while the husband contended it was entirely community prop-
erty.43 The trial court rejected both contentions and found instead that
both separate and community interests had been established and that
the property should be apportioned." In apportioning the property,
the trial court regarded the loan proceeds as community property. The
38. Young, supra note 17, at 198.
39. See VERR ALL, supra note 8, at 97. This presumption is codified in CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5110 (West Supp. 1982); see supra notes 11-13.
40. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
41. The traditional formula bases ownership interests upon the proportionate equity
contributions of the parties, i.e., the down payment and the amount of the loan principal
repaid. This formula will be referred to as the equity contributions formula.
42. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
43. Id at 454, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
44. Id at 456, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674. This aspect of the A4ufmulh case was expressly
disapproved in In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr.
853, 857. The Lucas court held that when separate property is used for the down payment
on a residence purchased during marriage, the contributing spouse must demonstrate that
there was an agreement that the contributing spouse was to maintain a separate property
interest in the residence. Absent such an agreement, it would be presumed that the separate
Vol. 15
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court thus defined the community contribution towards the purchase
price as the amount of the loan, rather than as the amount of equity
contributed by community funds.
The court of appeal in Aufmuth approved this approach, stating
that "[t]he trial court was. . . justified in determining that the balance
of the purchase price on the home, obtained with a $50,000 loan, was
paid from community funds. ' 45 As justification for this view, the appel-
late court relied upon the "intent of the lender rule" and the presump-
tion that all property acquired during marriage, including loan
proceeds, is community property.46
In determining the proportionate interests, the Aufmuth trial court
considered the separate property contribution to be the $16,500 down
payment, and the community property contribution to be the $50,000
loan. The trial court then compared each contribution to the total
purchase price and applied the resulting fraction to the $58,500 capital
appreciation of the house. To compute the respective interests in the
house, the share of capital appreciation attributable to each source was
added to the amount of equity contributed by each source.47 Using this
formula, the trial court determined the community property interest to
property funds were a gift to the community. For a brief treatment of the issues and holding
of the Lucas case in this regard, see Note, 4 CAL. FAM. L. REP. 1406 (1980).
45. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
46. Id at 455-56, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673. The "intent of the lender rule," or Gudej rule,
states that "It]he character of property acquired upon credit during marriage is determined
according to the intent of the lender to rely upon the separate property of the purchaser or
upon a community asset." Id at 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (citing Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.
2d 202, 210, 259 P.2d 656, 661 (1953)). TheAufmuth court apparently relied upon language
in Gudel]: "There is a rebuttable presumption that property acquired on credit during mar-
riage is community property. . . . But 'funds procured by the hypothecation of separate
property of a spouse are separate property of that spouse.'. .. The proceeds of a loan made
on the credit of separate property are governed by the same rule." Id at 210, 259 P.2d at
661; see 89 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674. The Aufmuth court therefore con-
cluded that there is a presumption that the proceeds of a loan acquired during marriage are
community property unless evidence exists tending to show that the lender extended the
loan "on thefaith of existing separateproperty belonging to the acquiring spouse. " Id at 455-
56, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (emphasis in original) (citing Estate of Ellis, 203 Cal. 414, 416, 264
P. 743, 744 (1928); Estate of Abdale, 28 Cal. 2d 587, 592, 170 P.2d 918, 922 (1946); Gudelj v.
Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d at 210, 259 P.2d at 661).
47. On the date of trial, the balance outstanding on the $50,000 loan was $47,000. The
equity contribution of the community was therefore $3,000. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 453, 152 Cal.
Rptr. at 672. The Aufmuth formula consists of four basic computations, as follows:
1. Market value - purchase price = capital appreciation
2. Amount of contribution towards purchase price = percentage of contribution
3. Capital appreciation x percentage of contribution = share of capital
appreciation
4. Share of capital appreciation + equity contribution = total share
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be $46,986 and the separate property interest to be $31,014.48
The wife appealed, contending that the respective interests should
have been determined by the ratio of equity contributions from each
source to the total of equity contributions from both sources.49 The
court of appeal disagreed, and found instead that the formula used by
the trial court was correct. The court of appeal stated that the wife's
position was based upon "the erroneous assumption that the proceeds
of the real estate loan were [the] wife's separate property."' 0
Clearly, the effect of the Aufmuth formula, as contrasted with the
traditional equity contributions formula, was to enlarge the community
property share. Under Aufmuth, the community contribution was con-
sidered to be the total amount of the loan, rather than the equity con-
tributed by way of principal reduction; the separate property down
payment was compared to the total purchase price rather than to the
total of equity contributions. This effect may be dramatically illustrated
by comparing the results obtained using the Aufmuth formula with
those that would have been obtained using the equity contributions
formula. Under Aufmuth, the separate property share of the $78,000
total realizable equity was $31,014, or 39.76%; using equity contribu-
tions, it would have been $66,000, or 84.61%. Under the Aufmu/h
formula, the community property share was $46,986, or 60.24%; using
equity contributions it would have been $12,000, or 15.39%.5
48. Id at 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 675. The purchase price of the house was $66,500. Its
fair market value was stipulated to be $125,000. The capital appreciation was therefore
$58,500. There was, then, $78,000 total equity to be divided, i.e., $125,000 minus the out-
standing loan balance of $47,000. This is divided into $58,500 appreciation and $19,500
contributed equity. The trial court first determined the percent of the purchase price attribu-
table to separate and community funds. The separate property contribution was the $16,500
down payment; the community contribution was the $50,000 loan. The resulting percent-
ages are therefore 24.81% for the separate property (16,500 divided by 66,500), and 75.19%
for the community (50,000 divided by 66,500). The capital appreciation was then divided
according to these percentages. The separate property share of the appreciation was there-
fore $14,514 ($58,500 x 24.81%), and the community property share was $43,986 ($58,500 x
75.19%). To arrive at the final figures the court then added these sums to the respective
equity contributions from each source. The final totals were thus $31,014 for the separate
property share ($14,514 appreciation added to $16,500 contributed to equity as down pay-
ment), and $46,986 for the community property share ($43,986 appreciation added to $3,000
contributed to equity as principal reduction on the loan).
49. Id at 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 675. Using this formula, the community property inter-
est would be 15.39% ($12,000) and the separate property interest 84.61% ($66,000). See infra
note 51.
50. Id
51. "Equity" is used in two senses in this comment. One is to refer to cash contributions
to the purchase price which will be recovered when the property is sold, i.e., the equity
contributions, which consist of the down payment and principal reduction. Here, "total eq-
uity" refers to the net amount realizable upon sale of the property, i.e., the fair market value
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B. In re Marriage of Lucas: Apportionment of the home
acquired during marriage.
1. Facts and holding
In 1980, the California Supreme Court, in In re Marriage of Lu-
cas, 5 2 approved the Aufmuth formula, terming it "the proper method"
of pro rata apportionment. 53  The facts of Lucas were similar to those
ofAufmuth. A couple purchased a home during marriage, paying for it
with a down payment from the wife's separate property and a loan as-
sumec by the community. All payments on the loan were made with
community property funds.5 4
The trial court held that the wife had established a separate prop-
erty interest in the home, and apportioned the home using the equity
contributions method. The purchase price of the home was $23,300.
This was supplied by a $6,351.57 down payment from the wife's sepa-
rate funds, and a $16,948.43 loan assumed by the community. The wife
also contributed $2,962 for improvements on the home. The fair mar-
ket value at the time of trial was $56,250, with an outstanding loan
balance of approximately $14,600. Community funds were used to pay
$2,052.32 of the loan.5 The court computed the net realizable equity
to be $41,650.50. This figure was then reduced by $2,962, the amount
spent on improvements, leaving $38,688.50 as the total value of the
property subject to apportionment. The respective separate property
and community property contributions to equity ($6,351.57 down pay-
ment with separate funds and $2,052.32 principal reduction from com-
munity funds) were divided by the total equity contributions
($8,403.89).56 The trial court therefore awarded the wife a 75.58% in-
terest, or $29,241, as her separate property. The community property
minus the outstanding loan balance. Total equity therefore consists of contributed equity
plus capital appreciation. Under the equity contributions formula, the community property
share would be the percent of total equity contributions made by the community. Total
contributed equity would be $19,500 ($16,500 from down payment, $3,000 from principal
reduction). The community share would therefore be 15.39% ($3,000 divided by $19,500).
Likewise, the separate property share would be 84.61% ($16,500 divided by $19,500). The
net realizable equity in the house is then divided according to these percentages. The net
equity is $78,000 ($58,500 capital appreciation and $19,500 contributed equity). The respec-
tive shares would therefore be: community $12,000 (15.39% x $78,000), separate $66,000
(84.61% x $78,000).
52. 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
53. Id at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
54. Id at 811, 614 P.2d at 286, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
55. Id at 812, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
56. Id
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share was determined to be a 24.42% interest, or $9,477.50.5
The supreme court found that the trial court had incorrectly de-
cided the issue of whether a separate property interest in the home had
been established and remanded the case for reconsideration.58 The
court noted, however, that:
[I]n the event that on reconsideration the court finds there was
a separate property interest in the residence, we discuss
briefly the question of the proper method of calculating the
community and separate interests. In these inflationary times
when residential housing is undergoing enormous and rapid
appreciation in value, we believe that the most equitable
method of calculating the separate and community interests
when the down payment was made with separate funds and
the loan was based on a community or joint obligation is that
set forth by Justice McGuire in In re Marriage ofAufmuth.5 9
The Lucas court explained that under the Aufmuth formula the
community and separate interests would be determined by adding the
amount of capital appreciation attributable to each source to the
amount of equity contributed from each source.60
If this formula is applied to the Lucas facts, the separate property
share would be $14,526.30 (as compared to $29,241 obtained by the
trial court using the equity contributions formula); the community
property share would be $23,865.59 (as compared to $9,477.50 ob-
tained by the trial court).6
57. Id The resulting percentages, 75.58% and 24.42%, were multiplied by the net equity
in the house to determine the dollar amounts of the separate and community interests:
$29,241 and $9,477.50 as stated by the court. Id The correct result is $29,240.78 and
$9,447.73 when actually computed using the figures given. The discrepancy apparently arises
from slightly different amounts being stated in the findings and in the interlocutory judg-
ment. Id at 812 n.1, 614 P.2d at 287 n.1, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 855 n.1.
58. Id at 815-16, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 857; see supra note 44.
59. Id at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
60. Id at 816-17 n.3, 614 P.2d at 290 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858 n.3.
61. These figures were computed as follows: The capital appreciation was determined by
calculating the increase in value of the house, and deducting the payments made for im-
provements. (Fair market value, $56,250, minus purchase price, $23,300 and $2,962 spent
on improvements = $29,988). The separate and community percentages of this appreciation
were determined by dividing the respective separate and community contributions towards
the purchase price by the purchase price. (Separate share: $6,351.57 down payment divided
by $23,300 purchase price = 27.26%; community share: $16,948.43 loan divided by $23,300
= 72.74%). The capital appreciation, $29,988, was then allocated according to the percent-
age obtained, resulting in $8,174.73 as the separate property share, and $21,813.27 as the
community property share. The capital appreciation for each share was then added to the
equity contributed by separate and community funds to arrive at the final figures: Separate
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The entire issue of the proper method of apportionment is dis-
posed of by the Lucas court in three sentences,6 2 with the formula be-
ing explained in a footnote.63 The court described the basic effect of
the formula as "giv[ing] the spouse who made the separate property
down payment a separate property interest in the residence in the pro-
portion that the down payment bears to the purchase price; the commu-
nity acquires that percentage of the residence which the community
loan bears to the purchase price." 64
When the court described the community interest as "that percent-
age of the residence which the community loan bears to the purchase
price," it was referring to a percentage of the capital appreciation and
not to a percentage of the total equity.65 To that percentage, of course,
is added a reimbursement of the actual amount of equity contributed.6
Strictly speaking, therefore, the formula as applied differs from the
formula as described. That is, only capital appreciation is apportioned;
equity contributions are reimbursed.
2. Analysis
The Lucas/Aufmuth formula has been called legally and arithmet-
ically inconsistent67 because the formula combines and confuses the
share = $14,526.30 ($8,174.73 capital appreciation + $6,351.57 down payment); Community
share = $23,865.59 ($21,813.27 capital appreciation + $2,052.32 principal reduction).
62. 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858. The major portion of the
court's treatment is found supra in text accompanying note 59 and infra in text accompany-
ing note 64.
63. The court illustrated its explanation of the formula with the following hypothetical:
These principles may be exemplified by considering a house purchased for
$100,000, with the wife paying the entire down payment of $20,000 from separate
property funds and the community contributing the rest of the purchase price in
the amount of a loan for $80,000. There would be a 20 percent separate property
interest and an 80 percent community property interest in the house. Assume that
the fair market value of the house at the time of trial is $175,000, resulting in a
capital appreciation of $75,000, and the mortgage balance at the time of separation
was $78,000. The value of the separate property interest would be $35,000, which
represents the amount of capital appreciation attributable to the separate funds (20
percent of $75,000) added to the amount of equity paid by separate funds
($20,000). The net value of the community property interest would be $62,000,
which represents the amount of capital appreciation attributable to community
funds (80 percent of $75,000) added to the amount of equity paid by community
funds ($80,000 minus $78,000).
Id at 816-17 n.3, 614 P.2d at 290 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858 n.3.
64. Id at 816, 614 P.2d at 289-90, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
65. See supra note 51 for an explanation of total equity.
66. See supra note 47.
67. See Barnett, Casenote: Lucas v. Lucas, or Footnotes From Far-Away Forums, L.A.
Daily Journal, Report Section, Dec. 19, 1980 at 15.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
concepts of debt and equity investment. 68 According to this view, reim-
bursement is appropriate where the investment in the enterprise is a
loan, or debt investment. Profit sharing is appropriate where the inves-
tor is a partner or shareholder in the enterprise, ! e., where there is eq-
uity investment. Because California awards the community a
percentage interest in the ownership of property purchased with both
separate and community funds, logic dictates that once the percentage
of ownership is determined, those percentages should be applied to the
total value of the residence. 69 Accordingly, the community and the
spouse making the separate property down payment should divide the
amount realized on the sale of the residence according to the percent-
age of ownership interests. The amount to be divided is the amount of
the sales price remaining after all liabilities (t e. the balance of the loan
outstanding) have been paid.70
This is simply an argument that the total equity in the residence
should be divided according to the percentages of ownership. This ar-
gument fails to recognize that, realistically, if the community has con-
tributed the loan proceeds, it has also "contributed" a liability of
almost equal magnitude-the resulting indebtedness. To regard this as
a liability of both separate and community interests combined rather
than as a community liability alone would be unfair to the separate
interest.
The Lucas/Aufmuth formula handles this problem, in effect, by
dividing the total sales price of the residence by the respective owner-
ship percentages, and subtracting from the community share the out-
standing balance of the loan. It is clear that if both the capital
appreciation and the original purchase price are divided according to
the percentage of contributions to the purchase price, the total sales
price is thereby similarly divided. If the community then pays off the
outstanding loan balance, the community share is its percentage of the
capital appreciation plus the amount of principal that had been paid on
the loan.7 The formula thus recognizes the outstanding loan amount
68. Id at 15-16. The "most glaring and obvious difference between 'loan' and 'partner-
ship' is that a lending mandates a return of the monies lent plus interest, etc., whereas an
investment dictates only that the investor share in profits." Id at 17.
69. Id at 18.
70. Id at 17. Illustration IA. The author would divide the $20,000 cash received from
the sale for $100,000 of a house purchased with a $20,000 separate property down payment
and an $80,000 community loan (no principal paid off) in proportion to the investment per-
centages: separate property, 20% or $4,000 and community property, 80% or $16,000. Note
how the entire loan balance was subtracted not from the community share of the sales price,
but from the total amount of the sales price.
71. Assume a house purchased for $100,000 ($20,000 separate property down payment,
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as a community debt.72
Any imprecision in logic can best be viewed as the result of an
attempt by the court to find a formula which permits the spouses to
share any increase in the value of their residence while still being fair to
the spouse who contributed the down payment. Using the Lu-
cas/Aufmuth formula, the "percentage of the residence" determined to
be community property will generally be from 70 to 90 percent.73 To
distribute the total equity in the residence according to this percentage
would result in giving the community not only most of the profit, but
most of the separate property down payment as well.7 4 Realizing this,
the Aufmuth court rejected this position.75
The harsh and inequitable consequences that could result from the
equity contributions formula can best be illustrated by two examples.
First, in the Aufmuth situation, the wife, who made a $16,500 down
payment from her separate property, would have received only
$19,351.80 of the $78,000 total equity.76 Second, assume that a house is
purchased for $100,000 - $20,000 from separate property down pay-
$80,000 community loan) is sold for $175,000 with $78,000 remaining to be paid on the loan.
Dividing the total sales price by the percentage of community interest gives a gross commu-
nity share of $140,000 ($175,000 x 80%). If from this amount, the $78,000 outstanding on the
loan is subtracted, a net community share of $62,000 is obtained. Note that this is the same
result that would be obtained by first dividing the $75,000 capital appreciation based on the
percent of ownership interest, and then adding the equity contribution ($75,000 x 80% =
$60,000; $60,000 + $2,000 principal reduction = $62,000). The hypothetical example is
taken from the Lucas case, 27 Cal. 3d at 816-17 n.3, 614 P.2d at 290 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. 858
n.3; see supra note 63 for text of footnote. Although theAufmuth court says that it is "appar-
ent" that the trial court used the latter method, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 457, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 675,
the method that it adopted and approved, the results are the same using both approaches. It
is clear, in any case, that the Aufmuth court treated the outstanding loan balance as a com-
munity liability.
72. For an explanation of a contrasting treatment of the loan, see supra note 71.
73. This represents the amount of the loan, or that portion of the purchase price not
contributed by the down payment. With rising prices, percentage amounts of down pay-
ments can be expected to drop. See, ag., THE MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE EXECUTIVES
REPORT, Nov. 15, 1980 at 2, reporting a proposal by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to
allow federal savings and loan associations to cut the down payment requirement from 20%
to 10%.
74. TheAufmuth court noted that the effect of the contention that the total equity in the
house should be distributed in strict proportion to the amounts of community and separate
funds invested "would be to give the community a 75 percent interest in wife's original
$16,500 investment, which would deny her its full reimbursement." 89 Cal. App. 3d at 457,
152 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
75. Id
76. The total equity of $78,000 was determined by subtracting the $47,000 loan balance
from the fair market value of $125,000. Note that the total equity thus consists of the $58,500
capital appreciation and the $19,500 equity contributed by the parties. The separate property
investment was $24.81%. See-supra note 48. $78,000 x 24.81% = $19,351.80.
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ment, $80,000 from a community loan - and the house is then sold for
$175,000, with $78,000 remaining to be paid on the loan.77 Division of
the total equity according to the percentage of ownership interests
would result in a separate property share of only $19,400, which is less
than the original investment.
Several aspects of the economy make the 1980's an appropriate
time for a change in the pro rata method of apportionment from the
equity contributions formula to the Lucas/Aufmuth formula. One is
simply the enormous increase in the value of real estate.78 This in-
crease is made even more significant by the fact that the price of homes
has risen at a much greater rate than income.79 It is both equitable and
consistent with basic community property principles that where an as-
set purchased with both separate and community funds has increased
greatly in value, the major part of that increase should be shared
equally by the spouses.
Another factor which makes the Lucas/Aufmuth formula more eq-
uitable is rising interest rates.80 Under the equity contributions
formula, the community's interest is determined by reduction of princi-
pal on the loan. But rising interest rates make principal reduction an
increasingly imperfect measuring stick, because as interest rates rise,
the amount of principal repaid during the initial period of the loan
term drops. For instance, in the first seven years of a thirty year loan at
7%, the principal pay back is 8.85%; at 12%, it is 3.75%; at 15%, only
77. This hypothetical situation is the one used by the Lucas court to illustrate the
Aufmuth formula. See 27 Cal. 3d at 816-17 n.3, 611 P.2d at 290 n.3, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858
n.3. See also supra note 63.
78. From 1973 to 1979, the median price of a new home increased 107.1% to $67,300.
U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 10, 1979, at 76. This trend has been even more pro-
nounced in the Western United States: from 1973 to 1978, the nationwide median price of a
new home rose from $32,500 to $55,700, while the median figure in the Western United
States rose from $32,400 to $61,300. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, U.S. DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1978). In addition, certain areas of California now have homes
with typical pieces well in excess of $100,000, and rates of appreciation among the highest in
the United States. See MONEY, March, 1980 at 46.
79. From 1970 through 1976, the median price of new homes rose 88.9%, while median
family income rose 47%. Downs, Public Policy and the Rising Cost of Housing, 8 REAL Es-
TATE REvIEw 27, 27-28 (1978).
80. Interest rates on home mortgages rose gradually from about 4% in 1950 to 8 to 9% in
the late 1970's. Thereafter, there has been a rapid increase, with rates reaching 13% by 1980,
and rising to above 15% in early 1981. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
(91st ed. 1970), for rates from 1950-1970, (99th ed. 1978), for rates from 1970-1977. Monthly
rates for 1980 and 1981 may be found in issues of the FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD
JouRNAL.
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2.13%.8 Longer loan periods82 accentuate this effect: the principal re-
duction on a forty year loan 'at 12% is only 1.11% after seven years.
In addition, rising interest rates increase monthly payments. Thus,
81. Figures derived from loan amortization tables obtained using RJ Beta Loan Amorti-
zation System, RI Software Systems, run on a Burroughs B80 computer.
82. See MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE EXEcUTIVES REPORT, Nov. 15, 1980, at 2, re-
porting on a proposal by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to permit federal savings and
loan associations to make forty year mortgage loans. The effect of rising interest rates and
lengthening loan terms is illustrated by the following graph:
rate 0 
Interest = 24%
40 50 60 70
Percent of Principal Paid Back
80 90 100
Reprinted by permission from the REAL ESTATE REviEw, Fall 1981, Volume 1I, Number 3.
Copyright 1981, Warren, Gorham and Lamont, Inc., 210 South Street, Boston, Mass. All
Rights Reserved.
The graph shows the relationship between interest rate, loan term, and principal payback. If
there is no interest, the graph would show a straight line, because the amount of loan repaid
would not vary with the amount of the loan term elapsed. As interest rates rise, the curve
bows upwards because less principal is repaid in the early years, and more in the later years.
This effect becomes extreme with high-interest, long-term loans. See R. Beers, Shorter Mfort-
gage Terms are Betterfor Home Buyers, 11 REAL ESTATE REviEw 93, 94-95 (1981).
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installment payments are larger in amount, but principal pay back is
less. For example, the initial $1,028.62 payment on a $100,000, thirty
year loan at 12% consists of $1,000 interest and $28.62 principal. At
15% the initial $1,264.45 payment is $1,250 interest and $14.45 princi-
pal. 3 The second loan costs 35% more than the first, but the principal
reduction is about one half as much. The effect of rising interest rates,
then, is to make the purchase of a smaller ownership interest more
costly. That is, the amount of payments rises, but the amount of princi-
pal drops. The effect of changing the community contribution from
principal reduction to loan amount is not only to increase greatly the
community percentage of investment, but also to avoid determining the
community investment by a measure that increases in cost as it de-
creases in amount.
Of course, principal was always a fairly short measuring stick be-
cause so little principal is paid in the first years of a loan. Under the
equity contributions method it would be unusual for the community
contribution even to equal, much less exceed, the separate property
contribution. This is true because the median length of a marriage
ending in divorce in California is substantially shorter than the length
of time required to pay an amount of principal equal to the down
payment.'
3. Summary
The impact of the Lucas case is twofold. First, the decision
adopted principles which increase the difficulty of establishing a sepa-
rate property interest in a residence purchased with both separate and
community funds. The main holding of the Lucas case was that in
dual-source-of-funds acquisitions of a family residence, where spouses
83. See supra note 81.
84. The median length of a marriage in California has been about seven years through-
out the 1970's. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (101st ed. 1980). As-
suming down payments of from 10% to 30% of the purchase price, 11% to 43% of the
corresponding loan would have to be paid off to equal the dollar amount contributed by the
down payment. For 30 year loans, at 7%, this takes from eight years and three months to 20
years and one month; at 12% from 12 years and seven months to 23 years and three months;
at 15% from 15 years and nine months to 24 years and five months. The community share
would therefore usually fall short of the separate share if those shares were determined by
the ratio of equity contributions. In the first seven years of a 7% 30 year loan, 8.85% of the
principal is paid; at 12%, 3.34% of the principal is paid; at 15%, 2.13% of the principal is paid.
The effect is magnified by longer loan terms: only 1.11% of a 40 year loan at 12% is paid in
seven years and .475 of 1% of a 40 year loan at 15%. The following table shows graphically
that a 50% payback would rarely be achieved by the community during the course of most
California marriages, assuming of course that the community would be paying the earlier,
rather than the later, payments.
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hold the property as community property by title or by virtue of the
statutory presumption created by Civil Code section 5110,11 the resi-
dence will be regarded as entirely community, in the absence of a con-
trary agreement.86 This changes the traditional rule that the
presumption of community property can be rebutted by tracing the
source of funds to separate property. 7 The result of the tracing doc-
trine was that if it was possible to trace the purchase funds to separate
property, the property would retain its character as separate property,
even if it had undergone a change in form or identity."8 Accordingly,
the investment represented by the down payment made with traceable
separate funds would retain its identity as separate property, although
transformed into a proportionate share of the house purchased with the
down payment.
Second, the Lucas court adopted a formula that will result in a
significantly larger community property share when apportionment of
a residence purchased during marriage is found to be appropriate.
That the Lucas court was willing to adopt a formula which bases the
community percentage upon the full loan amount, regardless of the
outstanding balance, is an indication of the importance the court
placed upon employing an apportionment formula which is appropri-
ate for "these inflationary times when residential housing is undergoing
YEARS TO 50% PAYBACK AT 6%
Term of loan in years Years to 50% payback
10 5.7
15 9.1
20 12.8
30 21.0
40 29.9
YEARS TO 50% PAYBACK AT 16%
10 6.8
15 11.2
20 15.9
30 25.7
40 35.6
Adapted from R. Beers, Shorter Mortgage Terms are Betterfor Home Buyers, I 1 REAL ES-
TATE REviEw 93, 95 (1981).
85. "When a single-family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by them during
marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division of such property upon dissolution
of marriage or legal separation only, the presumption is that such single-family residence is
the community property of the husband and wife." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp.
1981).
86. In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
87. See VERRALL, supra note 8, at 99.
88. In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 255-56, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 490
(1973). For an explanation of tracing and the exchange doctrine, see supra note 15.
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enormous and rapid appreciation in value." 9
The Lucas case should mean that many homes purchased with a
separate property down payment and a loan extended to the commu-
nity will be found to be entirely community in character. It should also
mean that when such homes are apportioned, they will be chiefly com-
munity in character. The entire thrust of the case, therefore, is strongly
pro-community.
C In re Marriage of Moore: Apportionment of the Home Wfhere
Acquisition Begins Prior to Marriage
1. Facts and holding
The California Supreme Court again considered the issue of the
proper method of apportionment of a family residence purchased with
both community and separate funds in In re Marriage of Moore.90
The situation in Moore differed from the situation in Aufmuth and Lu-
cas in that the purchase of the residence was initiated prior to, rather
than during, the marriage. In Moore, Lydie purchased a house approx-
imately eight months prior to her marriage to David, making a
$16,640.57 down payment, and obtaining the rest of the purchase price
with a $40,000 loan.9 Lydie made the first seven payments on the
loan. After the marriage of the parties in late 1966, community prop-
erty funds were used to make all payments until Lydie and David sepa-
rated in June, 1977.92 Thereafter, Lydie lived alone in the house,
making payments from her separate property which reduced the princi-
pal by $581.07. Added to the $245.18 principal from the first seven
payments and the down payment, this made her total equity contribu-
tion $17,466.82. The community paid $5,986.20 in principal. At the
time of trial the house had a fair market value of $160,000, 93 reflecting
a capital appreciation of $103,359.43 and a total equity of $126,812.45.
The trial court apportioned the house using the equity contributions
method, and thereby awarded $94,444.59 as Lydie's separate property
share and $32,367.86 as the community property share.
94
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
90. 28 Cal. 3d 366, 618 P.2d 208, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980).
91. Id at 370, 618 P.2d at 209, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
92. Id
93. Id
94. The supreme court explained the trial court's computations as follows:
The community interest was calculated by multiplying the equity value of the
house by the ratio of the community's reduction of principal to the total amount of
principal reduction by both community and separate property ($5,986.20 divided
by $23,453.02 equals 25.5242 percent). The amount of the community interest was
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The wife did not appeal the finding of the trial court that the com-
munity had acquired an interest in the house. The supreme court also
accepted that determination unquestioningly, commenting briefly, in a
footnote, that it was "clear under California law that the interest is
properly characterized as a community property interest in the
house."95 The husband appealed, however, contending that the com-
munity contribution should have been based upon the full amount of
the payments made, including interest, taxes, and insurance, rather
than being based solely upon principal.96 The supreme court rejected
this contention, finding that interest, taxes, and insurance were properly
excluded from the calculation of ownership interests.
97
Considering the calculation of interests made by the trial court, the
supreme court said that the Lucas/Aufmuth formula should have been
used. That formula "recognize[s] the economic value of the loan taken
to purchase the property."98 The court noted that "[a]lthough many
formulae have been suggested, we are not persuaded that any of them
would be an improvement over" the Lucas/Aufmuth formula.9 9 The
supreme court stated that the trial court's use of the equity contribu-
tions formula was not appropriate, as it "ignore[d] the role of the loan"
and was inconsistent with the principles of Lucas/Aufmuth.l ° The
court computed the interests under the Lucas/Aufmuth formula, deter-
mining that the separate share would be $109,901.16, and the commu-
nity share would be $16,911.29.101 However, the supreme court
thus determined to be $32,367.86. Lydie's separate property interest was calculated
by multiplying the equity value of the house by the ratio of the separate property
reduction of principal to the total amount of principal reduction ($17,466.82 di-
vided by $23,453.02 equals 74.4758 percent). Lydie's separate property interest was
thus determined to be $94,444.59.
Id at 370, 618 P.2d at 209, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
95. Id at 371 n.1, 618 P.2d at 210 n.l, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664 n.l.
96. Id at 371, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
97. Id at 373, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id at 374, 618 P.2d at 212, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
101. The court explained its computations as follows:
The separate property percentage interest is determined by crediting the separate
property with the down payment and the full amount of the loan less the amount
by which the community property payments reduced the principal balance of the
loan ($16,640.57 plus ($40,000 minus $5,986.20) equals $50,654.37). This sum is
divided by the purchase price for the separate property percentage share
($50,654.37 divided by $56,640.57 equals 89.43 percent). The separate property
interest would be $109,901.16, which represents the amount of capital appreciation
attributable to the separate funds (89.43 percent of $103,359.43) added to the
amount of equity paid by separate funds ($17,466.82). The community property
percentage interest is found by dividing the amount by which community property
payments reduced the principal by the purchase price ($5,986.20 divided by
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declined to reverse the trial court's calculation of the interests in the
house, because the error was in the husband's favor, and the wife had
not appealed the trial court's use of the equity contributions formula.10 2
2. Analysis
It is interesting that the supreme court did not question the finding
that a community property interest in the house had been established
by virtue of the loan payments made with community property funds.
This aspect of Moore has been criticized as inconsistent with the hold-
ing in Lucas that a separate property interest cannot be established
merely by demonstrating that separate property funds contributed to
the purchase price." 3 Although it has been argued that "[b]ecause the
Moore case did not involve a contested issue of whether the commu-
nity has an interest at all, Moore may ultimately be held applicable
only where there is an agreement or understanding that the community
has an interest,"'" it seems unlikely that the supreme court would
adopt a view which presumes that property acquired during marriage
(i.e. that portion of the residence purchased with community property
funds) is separate rather than community property. The Lucas court
held that separate property funds spent on a home purchased during
marriage will be presumed to be a gift to the community in the absence
of a contrary agreement. Accordingly, it is argued, to be consistent
with Lucas, the Moore court should have found a presumption of a gift
of community property funds spent after marriage on a home
purchased with separate property funds prior to marriage. 05 The bet-
$56,640.57 equals 10.57 percent). The community property share would be
$16,911.29, which represents the amount of capital appreciation attributable to
community funds (10.57 percent of $103,359.43) added to the amount of equity
paid by community funds ($5,986.20).
Id at 373-74, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
102. Id at 374, 618 P.2d at 212, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
103. The argument is as follows:
[]]he supreme court said in Lucas that when a spouse expends his or her separate
funds to purchase a community residence, this is presumed to be a gift to the com-
munity unless there is an agreement or understanding to the contrary. ... [W]hy
then is it not presumed to be a gpi by the community, absent an agreement or
understanding to the contrary, when community funds are voluntarily spent on the
purchase of a separate property residence?
(Emphasis in original). Note, 4 CAL. FAM. L. REP. 1458, 1461 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
CFLR]. Another commentator has also suggested that practicing lawyers should "argue that
all community contributions reducing principal are presumed to be a gift to the separate
residence, absent an agreement to the contrary (following the logic of Lucas)." Rosenson,
Divorce Caiffornia Style, Los ANGELEs LAW. at 31 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rosenson].
104. CFLR, supra note 103, at 1462.
105. Id at 1461. Note that these arguments reverse the basic community property
presumption.
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ter view is that consistency between the Lucas and Moore cases is pro-
vided by the basic community property principle that all property
acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property.
It is also surprising that the same court that was willing, in Lucas,
to change the traditional definition of "contributions towards the
purchase price" to include loan proceeds, should, in Moore, decline to
alter that definition further to include interest, taxes, and insurance, by
asserting that the pro rata rule "has been commonly understood as ex-
cluding payments for interest and taxes."' 1 6 This refusal is even more
surprising in light of the fact that the Vieux case, generally regarded as
the foundation of the California pro rata theory, supports the conten-
tion that interest and taxes should be considered in computing owner-
ship interests in jointly purchased property. 10 7 The Moore court, thus,
had very persuasive authority available to support a change in the law
as innovative as those made by the Lucas court, but still refused to
make such a change.
It is likely that the major reason the Moore court refused to con-
sider interest payments in its pro rata computations is that to do so
would be inconsistent with the conceptual framework of Lu-
cas/A ufmutA That framework regards the purchase price as the capi-
tal investment.108 Accordingly, as interest payments do not contribute
to this investment, and do not increase the value of the property, they
cannot be considered when a court is dividing assets and debts upon
dissolution of marriage.' 9
The key to this analysis is that Lucas/Aumuth uses contributions
to the purchase price as the basis for apportionment of ownership, and
regards the purchase price as consisting of down payment and loan
proceeds. Although interest payments may be very large, and principal
payments insignificant, there is no way that interest payments can be
regarded as part of the "purchase price" as defined by the Lucas and
106. 28 Cal. 3d at 372, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
107. The Moore court noted that the husband contended that the community property
interest should be determined by the full amount of payments made with community funds,
including interest, taxes and insurance, and that he relied upon Vieux for support. 28 Cal.
3d at 371, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664. The court then acknowledged that the
Vieux court did indeed include interest and taxes in its calculations. Id The Vieux court
stated that "so far as community funds might participate in the acquisition orprotection of
vested rights, to that extent proportionally should the property be considered as 'commu-
nity."' 80 Cal. App. at 228, 251 P. at 642 (emphasis added). This is a good argument for
including all expenses in computing ownership interests.
108. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 816, 614 P.2d at 289-90, 166 Cal. Rptr. at
858; In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
109. 28 Cal. 3d at 372, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
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Aufmuth decisions. It is clear that if loan proceeds are considered to be
part of the purchase price, the purchase price must be considered to be
that amount received by the seller, and not the amount ultimately spent
on the property by the buyer. According to Lucas/lufmuth, the invest-
ment is fixed by the amount received by the seller (the purchase or sales
price) and is independent of the actual dollar amounts contributed by
the purchaser (i.e. the contributions to the purchase price are computed
by reference to down payment and loan amount only; interest and
taxes are excluded, as is the amount of the outstanding loan balance).
This analysis prevailed against the contention that the community
property share was unjustly small in view of the large amount of com-
munity funds that had actually been spent.
The net effect of applying the Lucas/lufmuth formula, rather than
the equity contributions formula, in a Moore-type situation is to in-
crease greatly the separate property share. 110 Under the equity contri-
butions method, the separate property contribution is considered to be
the down payment plus the amount of the loan actually repaid using
separate funds. Applying the Lucas/Aufmuth formula, the spouse who
initiated the purchase is credited with the down payment, as well as the
full amount of the loan, less any principal reduction paid from commu-
nity funds. In effect, "the loan proceeds must be treated as a separate
property contribution.""' As previously noted, the use of principal re-
duction to determine ownership interests generally yields a fairly small
share. This is true even for the equity contributions method, where
principal reduction is compared only to the amount of the down pay-
ment, not to the full purchase price." 
2
Ironically, while Lucas/Aufmuth freed the community from hav-
ing its interest in a home purchased during marriage determined by the
"short measuring stick" of principal reduction, Moore has imposed the
use of that determination in the case of a home purchased prior to mar-
riage. In Moore, however, not only is principal reduction used, it -is
also compared against a larger amount, the full purchase price, reduced
only by the amount of principal actually paid with community funds.
110. With equity of $126,812.45, under equity contributions the separate share is
$94,444.59; underLucas/A4ufmuth it is $109,901.16. Under equity contributions the commu-
nity share is $32,367.86; under Lucas/.4ufmuth it is $16,911.29. See supra notes 94 & 101.
111. CFLR, supra note 103, at 1459. The Moore court noted that in a pre-marriage ac-
quisition, the down payment is a separate property contribution, and the loan is also a sepa-
rate property contribution, as it is based on separate assets. "Therefore under the
Lucas/lufmuth formula the proceeds of the loan must be treated as a separate property
contribution." 28 Cal. 3d at 373, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
112. See supra notes 82 & 84 and accompanying text.
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The application of the formula in a Moore situation leads, therefore, to
dramatically different results than are obtained in a Lucas-type
situation.
This can be demonstrated by recomputing the interests in the
Aufrmuth case as if it had involved a prior-to-marriage acquisition,
rather than a during-marriage acquisition. The result of such a recom-
putation is an increase in the separate property share from $31,000 to
$72,000 and a drop in the community property share from $47,000 to
$5,925.113 Note that this is an even smaller community property share
than the $12,000 that would have been received under the equity con-
tributions method." 4
In Moore; the supreme court stated that the pro rata formula used
by the trial court (which was the traditional equity contributions
formula) "appears to have been based upon a statement in In re Mar-
riage of Jafeman. . . that might be interpreted to mean that the inter-
ests are to be determined according to the proportionate equity
contributions only, with no credit given for the loan contribution.""
' 15
While this may seem to indicate that the Lucas/Aufmuth formula is
merely a reinterpretation of a rather recent case, the statement in
Jafeman,116 a 1972 court of appeals case, is a reiteration of similar
statements made in earlier cases. The exact language dates back at least
as early as 1967, to Bare v. Bare.117 The Bare court traced its treatment
of the pro rata issue to a 1953 case, Forbes v. Forbes,"" which relied
primarily upon Vieux. The Forbes court, unlike the Bare court, did not
refer to "equity" in discussing the contributions of the parties. How-
ever, the Bare court may merely have made explicit for the first time
what had in fact been assumed by previous pro rata apportionment
cases.
Although the language in these cases reflects an interesting pro-
113. Rosenson, supra note 103, at 30.
114. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
115. 28 Cal. 3d at 374, 618 P.2d at 211-12, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66.
116. "The community interest is determined by comparing the ratio of the community
investment to the total separate and community investment in the property. If the fair mar-
ket value has increased disproportionately to the increase in equity, the community is enti-
tled to participate in that increase in a similar proportion." In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29
Cal. App. 3d 244, 256-57, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 491 (1972).
117. The community is entitled to a minimum interest in the property represented by
the ratio of the community investment to the total separate and community invest-
ment in the property. In the event the fair market value has increased dispropor-
tionately to the increase in equity, the wife is entitled to participate in that
increment in a similar proportion.
256 Cal. App. 2d 684, 690, 64 Cal. Rptr. 335, 339 (1967).
118. 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 257 P.2d 721 (1953).
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gression, it is ambiguous; and it is certainly susceptible to the interpre-
tation used by the supreme court in Moore. Thus, Vieux stated that the
community had an interest "in the same proportion as the amount con-
tributed to the purchase price, [or] so far as community funds might
participate in the acquisition." 9 Forbes described the interest as being
"the ratio that the payments on the purchase price with community
funds bear to the payments made with separate funds."' 20 Bare restat-
ed Forbes and further described that ratio as the "ratio of the commu-
nity investment to the total separate and community investment in the
property."'121 The Jafeman court, like the Bare court, articulated both
"payments on the purchase price" and "investment in the property"
ratios.' 22 The word "investment," however, may be interpreted in ways
that are not synonymous with "purchase price." It may be taken to
mean the total amount, including interest, of all expenditures on the
property, or it may be taken to mean only the amount of equity
contributed. 12'
No court before Aufmuth specifically defined "investment in the
property." Although the Jafeman, Bare, and Forbes courts all referred
to and utilized formulas under which ownership interests are deter-
mined according to proportionate expenditures, those courts did not
attempt to define "investment in the property," but in fact considered
only funds actually expended by the parties.
The supreme court criticized the equity contributions formula be-
cause in considering "expenditures" to include only funds actually ex-
pended, it ignores the role of the loan. However, many previous
apportionment cases concerned fact situations in which an outstanding
loan balance was not involved, either because the purchase price was
entirely paid, or because the purchase did not involve a long term note
or mortgage.' 24 The Moore court further stated that the equity contri-
119. Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. at 228-27, 251 P. at 642.
120. Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 257 P.2d at 722 (citations omitted).
121. Bare v. Bare, 256 Cal. App. 2d at 690, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
122. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 256-57, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
123. For an example of a case where the court included the total expenditures of the
parties, see Estate of Caswell, 105 Cal. App. 475, 288 P. 102 (1930). There, husband and
wife both contributed funds to purchase an interest in a business with a purchase price of
$7,500. The parties spent $9,350, including $3,750 which the wife "turned over" to the hus-
band, and which "undoubtedly went into and was used in. . . the said business." Id at 482,
288 P. at 104.
124. See Giacomazzi v. Rowe, 109 Cal. App. 2d 498, 240 P.2d 1020 (1952) (total cost of
property $2,200, apparently entire amount was paid); Gettman v. Department of Water &
Power, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817 (1948) (life insurance policy divided in proportion
to premiums paid from separate and community funds); Maskuns v. Maskuns, 93 Cal. App.
27, 268 P.1093 (1928) ($1,400 paid for property, $700"by each spouse).
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butions formula might be the appropriate method to use when the loan
has been fully repaid.'25
Of course, if the loan were fully repaid, the results under both for-
mulas would be the same, because Lucas/Aufmuth treats the loan as if
fully repaid for purposes of determining the percentage contributions
towards the purchase price.1 26 That is, for purposes of ownership com-
putation, the party contributing the loan is considered to have contrib-
uted the full amount, regardless of how much principal that party
actually has paid off. The full loan amount may only be reduced by the
amount of principal reduction actually contributed by the other party.
The entire loan amount is thus always accounted for under Lu-
cas/Aufmuth, with reimbursement of actual equity contributed being
used to avoid giving the loan holder an unearned share of the down
payment contribution.
In sum, the loan amount is considered to be an asset for purposes
of computing ownership shares, but the outstanding balance is a liabil-
ity against the share of the party contributing the loan. In this respect,
the Lucas/A ufmuth approach to the ownership of the loan (and thus in
a Moore situation, to the ownership of the entire property) is more con-
sistent with the inception of right theory than with the pro rata the-
ory.127 The Lucas and Aufmuth decisions regarded the ownership of
the loan as being determined as of the initiation of the transaction, with
title irrevocably vested in the party taking out the loan. Thus, the party
subsequently making payments on the loan is credited only with the
amount of principal actually paid, while the party who originally pro-
cures the loan receives credit for the rest of the loan, regardless of any
outstanding balance.
Thus, in Moore, although the wife had paid off only $826.25 of the
$40,000 loan, and the community had paid $5,986.20, the entire loan
was considered to have been contributed by the wife, less ono, the
amount of principal paid by the community. 128 In effect, the wife was
considered to have contributed $34,013.80 of the $40,000 loan, al-
though her funds had accounted for only $826.25 in principal reduc-
tion. The wife was credited with the loan on the strength of having first
procured it, and for purposes of apportionment it remained 85% hers,
125. 28 Cal. 3d at 374, 618 P.2d at 212, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
126. For discussion of the Lucas/Aufmuth treatment of the loan, see supra notes 71-72
and accompanying text. "Lucas/Aufmuth requires that credit must be given for the loan
when a loan balance exists." CFLR, supra note 103, at 1460.
127. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
128. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 373, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
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despite the $33,187.55 outstanding balance, and despite the fact that
she had paid only 2% of the principal while the community had paid
15% of the principal. As a result, the community share of the capital
appreciation of the house, most of which was built up during the mar-
riage, and thus during the years when community funds were being
used to reduce the indebtedness on the house, was less than 11%.129
This type of situation is strikingly similar to the hypothetical situa-
tion posed by the Vieux court in articulating its reasons for rejecting the
inception of right theory:
Any other construction in these days of liberal terms with ref-
erence to installment purchase price contracts for the sale of
real property.. . would permit a husband, or a prospective
husband, to buy or to agree to buy any reasonable quantity of
lots or lands on the payment by him from his separate funds
of a comparatively insignificant sum and thereafter to pay
practically the entire purchase price from the community
funds, and yet successfully maintain that because in its incep-
tion the naked right to purchase. . . was his separate prop-
erty, it so remained.' 30
If the computations of the court in the Moore case are recomputed
based upon a thirty year, 15% loan, the separate property share would
be $116,761.18, as compared to $109,901.16 in the actual case; the com-
munity property share would be $5,462.69, as compared to $16,911.29.
In the Lucas hypothetical situation, if a home purchased with a $20,000
separate property down payment and an $80,000 community loan, with
a $78,000 loan balance and a current value of $175,000 is acquired dur-
ing marriage, the separate property share is $35,000 and the community
share is $62,000. If the home is acquired prior to marriage as in Moore,
however, the separate property share is $93,500 and the community
property share is $3,500.131
129. Id at 373-74, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
130. Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. at 227-28, 251 P. at 642.
131. The computations assume that the wife made the first 7 payments, the community
the next 127 payments, and the wife the following 8 payments. (The facts of the Moore case
state that the wife made the first 7 payments, that community property funds were used to
make payments during the marriage, and that the wife paid an additional $581.07 in princi-
pal following separation.) 28 Cal. 3d at 370, 618 P.2d at 209, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 663. Loan
amortization tables for a 7% loan were used to estimate that the wife's principal payment of
$581.07 made after separation is accounted for by 8 additional payments. Using a 15% loan,
however, the wife's equity contributions would be $16,937.29 ($16,640 down payment, and
$297.29 in principal reduction). The community contribution would be $1,938.80 in princi-
pal reduction. The community percentage share of the $56,640.57 purchase price would
therefore be 3.42%, and the separate property share would be 96.58%. The wife's contribu-
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These results are inconsistent with the rationale of the California
pro rata theory that "'[i]n the event the fair market value has increased
disproportionately to the increase in equity the [other spouse] is entitled
to participate in that increment in a similar proportion.' 132 The Vieux
court, in weighing the issue of whether an installment purchase initi-
ated prior to marriage should be deemed to confer full ownership as of
its inception, or whether title should be apportioned pro rata according
to the sources of finds, "concluded that justice would be better served
by interpreting. . . 'ownership'... in a manner which permits appor-
tionment of title." 
133
The California pro rata approach recognizes that property
purchased partially with community property funds is partially com-
munity property, and has been praised as being more just and hence
preferable to the inception of right approach. 134 Yet application of the
Lucas/Aufmuth formula to the premarital acquistion of a house, espe-
cially if financed with a high interest loan, results in a very small com-
munity share of the capital appreciation. This result is inconsistent with
the basic philosophy of pro rata apportionment. In premarital acquisi-
tions of homes purchased with both community and separate funds,
therefore, the Lucas/Aufmuth formula represents a return to the incep-
tion of right theory, because it determines ownership of the loan as of
its inception. To the extent that the formula fails to produce significant
sharing between the spouses of the capital appreciation of an asset
purchased partially with community funds, the formula also represents
a rejection of the underlying spirit of the pro rata theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Lucas/Aufmuth formula could have a significant anti-commu-
tion would be $16,640.57 down payment, plus total loan amount minus principal reduction
made from community funds: $16,650.57 plus $40,000 minus $1,937.80 equals $54,701.77.
Applying these percentages to the $103,359.43 capital appreciation yields the following
results: community share of capital appreciation: $3,534.89; separate property share:
$99,824.53. Adding the equity contributions from each source ($1,938.80 community prop-
erty, $16,937.29 separate property) yields the final sums: $5,462.69 community property
share and $116,761.18 separate property share. The total amount of the payments made by
the community would be over $64,000, based on monthly payments of $505.78. Figures
showing the complete computation of interests for the Lucas hypo are found in CFLR, supra
note 103, at 1463.
132. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 372, 618 P.2d at 210, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 664
(quoting Bare v. Bare, 256 Cal. App. 2d at 690, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 339).
133. Young, supra note 17, at 196.
134. Id; see also Note, 20 S. CAL. L. REv. 281, 283 (1946), in which the author states that
"from the standpoint of effecting substantial justice and fairness of result, the apportionment
theory is the most desirable."
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nity impact. It is likely that the majority of apportionment cases will
arise in a Moore-type context, in which the community share will be
rather small. Two factors lead to this conclusion. The first is the diffi-
culty of establishing a separate property interest in a home purchased
partially with separate property funds during marriage. 135 The second
is the frequency of remarriages, which increases the likelihood of a
spouse purchasing a home prior to marriage. 136 Thus, in a great many
cases, when a home is apportioned upon dissolution of marriage, one
spouse will receive the vast majority of the proceeds.
137
The Moore court's use of principal payments as a measure of the
community interest has been described as "extremely harsh and unfair
to the community."'13 This point was made in the context of the
court's refusal to consider interest payments as part of the community
contribution. The court's rationale was that interest could not be con-
sidered a contribution because it does not increase equity, and the
value of real property is represented by the owner's equity.1 39 How-
ever, the value of real property might more fairly be characterized as
being represented by the owner's equity and any increase in value, and
a fairer view of the loan as a contribution towards the purchase price
might recognize that the loan has a price.' 40 That is, the price of a
house can be regarded as a "combination of the selling price and the
financial terms of purchase or mortgage," which includes the interest
135. This stems from the main holding of the Lucas case, which has been characterized as
follows: "The net result is that a residence acquired during marriage and held in joint ten-
ancy will be community property from the first dollar up, regardless of separate property
contributions by either spouse, absent an agreement or understanding to the contrary."
Rosenson, supra note 103, at 29. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
136. Statistics show that more than one in every four marriages is a remarriage for at least
one spouse, and that up to 80% of those who divorce will remarry. Gurak and Dean, The
Re-Marinage Market: Factors Influencing the Selection of Second Husband, 3 J. DIVORCE
161, 161 (1979). Another example of the increasing divorce rate in California is the fact that
the divorce rate in Orange County is equal to the marriage rate. Tepper, Estate Planningfor
Second Marriages, 120 TRUSTs & ESTATES 16, 16 (1981).
137. This is illustrated by Moore, where the wife's total share of the house (her separate
property interest plus half the community interest) was $118,356.80, or 93.33%. The hus-
band's share was $8,455.64, or 6.67%. See supra note 94 for computations of the separate and
community property shares in the Moore case. Of course, a loan with a high interest rate
would increase this disparity. If the loan in Moore had been at 15%, the wife's total share
would be $119,492.52, or 97.77%. The husband's share would be $2,731.34, or 2.23%. See
supra note 131 for computations.
138. Rosenson, supra note 103, at 30.
139. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d at 372, 618 P.2d at 211, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
140. To repay a standard 30 year loan of $100,000 at 12%, $360,278.95 must be paid; at
15%, $455,159.12 must be paid. For forty year loans of $100,000, at 12%, $484,079.57 must be
paid; at 15%, $601,366.44. See supra note 81.
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rate, and the term or length of the loan. 141 The total equity in a house
is often quite independent of the amount of equity contributed by way
of down payment and principal payback; instead it consists almost en-
tirely of capital appreciation.
A fairer basis upon which to apportion such capital appreciation
would be to use as the community contribution towards the purchase
price that percentage of the loan represented by the percent of pay-
ments made with community funds. 142 Such an approach would make
the community share independent of interest rates. Alternatively, the
community share could be based upon that portion of the loan which
has been paid for by the community, i.e., the fraction of the total
amount of interest payable over the life of the loan that community
payments of interest represent. That approach would take account of
the dramatic effect of rising interest rates. Either approach would lead
to a more equitable sharing of the capital appreciation than is obtained
with the Lucas/Aufmuth formula. An alternative formula which would
lead to a more equitable division of an asset which is presumptively
community property would be more consistent with the reasoning of
the Vieux court, with the concerns underlying the California pro rata
theory, and with the basic philosophy of the community property
system.
In sum, the Lucas case is extremely pro-community, and should
result in significant sharing by divorcing spouses of the value of the
family residence. It is ironic indeed that the Moore decision, while
consistent with Lucas in its method of apportionment, will lead to op-
posite results. The Lucas/Aufmuth formula, which appeared to have
originated as a pro-community division device, may become, in actual
application, a tool used to carve out very small community property
shares in residences subject to pro rata apportionment.
Janice M. Corsino
141. J. Webb & R. Curcio, The Impending Real Estate Crask Fact or Fiction, 5 REAL
ESTATE Issuns 7, 9 (1980).
142. Thus, in the Moore case, where the community made 127 payments, the community
would be credited with having contributed 35.27% of the loan (127 divided by 360), or
24.91% of the purchase price.
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